Holistic Trust Design of E-Services by Lo Presti, Stéphane et al.
Holistic Trust Design of E-Services 
 
 
 
Stéphane Lo Presti
1, Michael Butler
2, Michael Leuschel
3 and Chris Booth
4 
 
 
1 Royal Holloway, University of London, Information Security Group, Egham, Surrey 
TW20 0EX, United Kingdom; Phone: +44 (0)1784 414346; Fax: +44 (0)1784 
430766; Stephane.Lo-Presti@rhul.ac.uk 
 
2 University of Southampton, School of Electronics and Computer Science, 
Southampton SO17 1BJ, United Kingdom; Phone: +44 (0)23 8059 2435; Fax: +44 
(0)23 8059 3045; mjb@ecs.soton.ac.uk 
 
3 Institut für Informatik, Heinrich-Heine Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstr. 1, D-
40225 Düsseldorf; Phone: +49 (0)211-8110711; Fax: +49 (0)211-81-10712; 
leuschel@cs.uni-duesseldorf.de 
 
4 QinetiQ ltd, WR14 3PS, Malvern, United Kingdom; Phone: +44 (0)1684 89 6400; 
Fax: +44 (0)1684 89 4389; cjmb@signal.qinetiq.com 
 Holistic Trust Design of E-Services 
 
Abstract. As a central issue of modern e-services, trust has to be tackled early during 
the development phases. We present and compare in this chapter various works and 
methodologies that contribute to this aspect. A Holistic Trust Design Methodology 
that combines useful aspects encountered in the existing works is then described in 
detail. It is based on a systematic analysis of scenarios that describe the typical use of 
the e-service by using a Trust Analysis Grid. The Trust Analysis Grid is composed of 
eleven Trust Issue Categories that cover the various aspects of the concept of trust and 
is used to guide the design of the computing system by analyzing and refining the 
scenarios, and providing hints at the suitability of technologies for the scenario. We 
illustrate this methodology on several examples. 
INTRODUCTION 
Trust has recently been recognized as a crucial and central property of modern 
systems that provide e-services in a variety of contexts. Because failing to address this 
issue correctly may have a profound and costly impact on the e-service development, 
the issue of trust must be tackled early during the development, so as to identify and 
mitigate it as early as possible. This chapter covers methodologies that help to do so. 
 
Trust is a human notion that goes beyond technical aspects of the system. It is 
important that it is not confused with other concepts, e.g. security, so that users 
understand and thus have confidence into the system. This aspect is reinforced by the 
rapid growth of e-services developed in, for example, pervasive computing (Huandget 
al., 1999) or multi-agent systems (Hanssens et al., 2002). 
 
Trust defies traditional analysis in that it encompasses a wide range of other issues at 
a high level of abstraction, for example security, risk, social engineering or the law, in 
an ever-increasing complex arrangement. The recent literature on trust (see 
(Rindeback & Gustavsson, 2004), (Josang et al., 2005) or (Staab et al., 2004) for 
example) shows a number of ways with which trust can be dealt. But the literature 
lacks a holistic point of view that can help understand which techniques or 
technologies are best in various contexts and circumstances. 
 
The design phase of the system development is the most appropriate time for analysis 
of trust in the system. This is the approach used to tackle more traditional issues like 
risk (Storey, 1996) and security (Anderson, 2001), and it has proven successful in 
improving the quality of systems. It can be seen as a process whose output is a set of 
requirements that must be addressed in the subsequent phases of the development. 
 
Based on those two ideas of holistic design, trust is considered in this chapter as an 
evolving, contextual and composite belief that one principal (trustor) has that another 
principal (trustee) will perform certain actions with certain expected results, when not 
all information about those actions is available. The various elements of this 
definition will be detailed in the remainder of this chapter. 
 
The first section presents current works on methodologies to help design trustworthy 
e-services. Then we present a methodology that builds upon the current understanding of trust and improves on the existing trust design methodologies. It provides a holistic 
analysis framework to help design trustworthy e-services where the user is the focus 
of attention. This framework is applied to several realistic systems under 
development, including e-health and e-learning, in the next section. 
EXISTING METHODOLOGICAL WORK TACKLING THE 
TRUST ISSUE 
There is a huge corpus of work on the issue of trust, but few concentrate on this issue 
during the design of a system development and fewer propose methodologies to help 
the design process. We present here representative contributions to this topic and 
discuss their advantages and disadvantages as holistic trust design methodologies. 
Typologies of Trust 
There are many general works that analyze and decompose the notion of trust so as to 
provide general guidelines and understanding into this notion. Some of them suggest 
in particular the holistic nature of the concept of trust, by combining together the 
various aspects of trust presented in other works. 
 
Though these works provide a necessary and fundamental insight into the notion of 
trust that any holistic trust design methodology should provide, and in particular a 
basic decomposition into its more elemental properties, they are not sufficient by 
themselves for devising an e-service design methodology as they provide no concrete 
help to the e-service designer. 
TRUST-EC e-Commerce Requirements 
The TRUST-EC project (Jones & Morris, 1999) lists the common applications in e-
Commerce and analyzes how they consider trust, taken as a kind of reliance of system 
stakeholders that is more general than dependability. The list of non-functional 
requirements for trust for the e-Commerce business derived from this analysis is 
comprised of confidentiality, integrity, availability, identification, prevention, 
traceability, quality, risk management, and authentication. This work concludes on the 
possible necessity of “a requirements process for e-business, based on the framework, 
which will assist developers in structuring both the process of eliciting trust requirements 
(by providing a checklist of issues to be discussed with different stakeholders), and the 
way in which such requirements are documented” (Jones & Morris, 1999). 
McKnight and Chervany’s Conceptual Framework 
McKnight and Chervany (McKnight & Chervany, 1996) analyze research papers on 
trust, taken from a wide range of domains: management, sociology, economics, 
politics, science, psychology.  They summarize the various views on trust in a 
conceptual framework based on six constructs, which themselves are decomposed 
into more elements. The basic concepts of the generic definition of trust of McKnight 
and Chervany are trusting intention, trusting behavior, trusting beliefs, system trust, 
dispositional trust, and situational decision. These general concepts are refined into 
notions like feelings of security, vulnerability, honesty, situational normality, belief-
in-person, or trust stance. This work is probably the one that provides the best view on 
the holistic nature of trust, in that it gathers information from domains whose 
problems are quite orthogonal, and it shows the intrinsically diverse and interwoven structure of trust. On the other hand, it covers such a wide scope of trust issues that it 
is difficult to use it concretely. 
Jøsang, Ismail and Boyd’s Analysis of Trust-related Applications 
and Models 
Jøsang, Ismail and Boyd (Josang et al., 2005) give a more technical overview of the 
research on trust, in particular by focusing on modern reputation systems. They 
describe five trust classes (borrowed from Grandison and Sloman's classification 
(Grandison & Sloman, 2000)) that describe the various layers of the concept of trust, 
namely provision trust, access trust, delegation trust, identity trust, and context trust. 
These classes are defined in the context of a trust purpose, which enables to 
instantiate the classes in a given situation. The semantics of trust considered in a 
given application is then described against two dimensions, the levels of subjectivity 
and specificity. Many examples of modern systems using reputation are presented, for 
example eBay (EBay, 2006), or Slashdot (Slashdot, 2006). 
General Methodologies 
This section presents methodologies to help in various aspects of the design of 
systems and e-services where trust is central. The following methodologies are based 
on ad-hoc concepts and methods but will show the possible approaches currently 
taken to design trustworthy systems. 
Security Requirements Specification Method 
Tan, Titkov and Poslad (Tan et al., 2002) devise an abstract security model that they 
apply to the case of an e-Banking service implemented as a multi-multi-agent system. 
This model is based on the concepts of asset, safeguard to protect the asset, threat to 
the asset and profile to specify policies and relationships between the previous 
concepts. A graphical notation is used to illustrate the model, where security domains 
are shown as groupings of concepts and profiles. The various assets are then described 
more precisely in the case of the e-Banking scenario, where the various services 
needed are modeled as assets. 
 
That analysis enables to discuss the various service design issues in the e-Banking 
scenario. But first the methodology is aimed at Multi-Agent Systems, though it could 
still be used more generally at a conceptual level, and secondly, the analyzed issues 
are related to the more technical side of trust, namely security, and they require expert 
knowledge (authentication, security policies). The ideas underlying this approach are 
good, but not developed enough to make it a holistic trust design methodology. 
Matrix Model 
Tan's trust matrix model (Tan, 2003) is a means to analyze trust-building services 
between trading partners in e-commerce. It proposes to represent an e-service in the 
form of a grid. The grid rows correspond to properties of the service grouped into 
three layers. The grid columns correspond to a theoretical decomposition of the notion 
of trust into four reasons, namely social signs, personal experience, understanding, 
and communality. Each reason is divided into two sources, depending on whether 
they correspond to trust created by a party of the transaction or a control mechanism. 
 The trust analysis in this framework is suited to the examination of a particular service 
offered by a system. It is also quite precise in that it considers a lot of trust issues, but 
those issues are specific to the kind of services examined in this work, namely 
Business-to-Business first trade situation. This approach is very rich in terms of the 
holistic view it provides into trust, but weak in terms of design features as it is not 
aimed at this task. 
Decompositional Model of Trust used in System Design 
Yan and Cofta (Yan & Cofta, 2003) define trust domains as areas of mobile 
communication where the definition of trust, which is a set of statements and goals, is 
common between the various elements. Gaps between these trust domains, implied by 
the subjectivity of the trust definitions, are bridged with particular components that 
are responsible for ensuring trust at a level above the one of the domains. The 
methodology is based on a graphical representation of entities, domains and their 
interconnections, enabling a view of the system at a higher level of abstraction. 
 
This methodology brings intuitiveness to system design and enables to treat the trust 
issue at a variable level of granularity, but it lacks accurateness to express more 
specific properties and localized problems, and it does not provide clear guidelines to 
help the system designer understand the various trust issues. It is in particular unclear 
what the application of the methodology would bring to examples other than the one 
presented. 
Holistic Analyses of Trust Relationships 
In the context of virtual communities, Ishaya and Mundy (Ishaya & Mundy, 2004) 
indicate that the potential barriers to trust development and management are fivefold: 
sociological, psychological, technological, legal, economic. They develop 
mechanisms to support the provision of trust, summarized by three tables that present 
relevant questions to ask about the elements of trust, the trust building process, and 
the security factors. 
 
Similarly, Grimsley and Meehan (Grimsley et al., 2004) consider trust from the 
perspective of internet-mediated community relations and decompose it into various 
dimensions, which are not necessarily orthogonal. The community trust compact and 
an experience management matrix described in this work are based on three 
dimensions, corresponding to the notions of information, control and influence. These 
two conceptual tools are represented by tables guiding the design of the project under 
consideration. 
 
These two works present a holistic view on trust mainly focused on the socio-
psychological phenomenon and where the subjective aspects of trust are captured by 
many concepts and notions expressed in long questions. These textual approaches at 
design are not satisfactory as they add a layer of subjectivity and are prone to errors. 
Furthermore they are very difficult to apply to technical systems, as they mainly 
consider abstract properties of human systems. 
Framework to derive Trust Assumptions 
Haley et al. (Haley et al., 2004) apply principles of requirements engineering to 
security systems with the goal of deriving trust assumptions during the system-level 
analysis. A graphical notation is used to define domains. Interfaces, phenomena and constraints are described in context and problem frame diagrams. Constraints 
explored in this work are security requirements that help identify threats and 
vulnerabilities at the system-level. The constraints are completed by trust assumptions 
that help satisfy the security requirements and that specify the system designer’s point 
of view on trust. 
 
This approach provides powerful features for e-service design, but it considers trust in 
the technical sense, i.e. implicit assumptions in the security model that need to be 
made explicit. The subjective, and thus holistic, nature of trust is not represented. 
Though apparently intuitive, the graphical notation can rapidly lead to cluttered 
diagrams, which impede on an effective design. 
The i* Graphical Design Framework 
The i* framework (Yu & Cysneiros, 2002; Yu & Liu, 2001) is a framework proposed 
to model non-functional requirements (privacy and security) in multi-agent systems. 
A composite graph is used to represent the relationships between actors of a system. 
Relationships are of four types: goal, task, resource and softgoal (goal that have no 
qualitative measure of satisfaction and are attached to graph edges). Trust 
relationships are expressed as softgoals. The SD (Strategic Dependency) and SR 
(Strategic Rationale) models enable to view the system at various levels of 
abstraction. An i* graph looks like a scenario annotated with interrelated keywords. 
 
The i* framework is interesting as it focuses on a user-centered scenario describing 
the e-service under consideration in its context of daily use and uses intuitive 
graphical features to represent properties. But as illustrated in (Yu & Cysneiros, 2002) 
i* graphs can very quickly become unreadable, and thus unusable to the e-service 
designer. 
Methods with a Formal Background 
This section covers some methodologies that use formal methods to design and 
specify the electronic system. Computing science formal methods stem from 
mathematics and aim to help design, develop, analyze and validate software so that it 
is correct, error-free and robust. The formal dimension of these methodologies 
provides a basis for automated reasoning and tool support, thus greatly easing the 
work of the designer and opening the door for systematic analysis. 
TROPOS 
TROPOS (Giorgini et al., 2004, 2005) is a graphical methodology for modeling and 
representing the various system dependencies with the aim of analyzing trust 
requirements in security properties of electronic systems. TROPOS extends the i* 
framework (see above) by defining new concepts (actor, resource) and relationships 
(delegation, negative authorization) with the goal of focusing on trust. The 
diagrammatical notation is formalized into the logical language Datalog so that the 
specification can be checked automatically with software. A CASE tool has been 
devised to draw TROPOS diagrams and checking its correctness. 
 
TROPOS builds upon i* and extends it with more precise security notions. It removes 
the disadvantage of needing to manage the complexity of its graph thanks to the formalization. On the other hand, this approach requires some knowledge of formal 
verification that may not be available in the design project. 
CORAS 
The CORAS methodology (Braendeland & Stolen, 2004; Vraalsen et al., 2005) 
implements risk assessment techniques using an extension of the UML semi-formal 
method. The expressiveness of UML profile is extended conceptually by introducing 
normative modalities borrowed from deontic logics so that legal risks can be better 
specified.  It covers the risk dimension of trust, but does not explicit any definition of 
trust. It requires and enables the system designer to use the definition most suited for 
his system. Various tools are available to use the methodology (Vraalsen et al., 2005) 
and a fully-formal view of CORAS is under development. 
 
The CORAS approach is close to software engineering as it uses the UML notation to 
model the system and it bases its analysis on a scenario. In these scenarios, a 
hierarchy of assets describes trust that must be protected from threats, vulnerabilities, 
and incidents. Evaluating in detail the risks associated with the system under 
examination enables to propose the solution to trust issues. The CORAS analysis 
methodology is partitioned into five sub-processes that are: establish the context; 
identify risks; analyze risks; evaluate risks; treat risks. This sequence is completed by 
a monitoring and review process that run in parallel and can restart the sequence of 
sub-processes. 
Conclusion 
A study of the existing works reveals that a decomposition of trust is central to any 
trust design methodology. General methodologies focus on a functional subset of 
properties, more well-known and less subjective, except for Holistic analyses of trust 
relationships (Grimsley et al., 2004; Ishaya & Mundy, 2004). But this limitation 
removes the holistic nature of trust, in that focusing on a sub property while eluding 
the others transforms the issue from trust to a different concept (e.g. security, risk). 
 
Most methodologies adopt an ad-hoc approach, without building on traditional design 
methodologies. This makes more difficult and costly the tackling of the trust issue in 
e-service design, and thus constitutes an impediment to the adoption of such 
methodologies in e-service development. While methodologies using a graphical 
representation bring intuitiveness to this task, it is quickly limited because of graph 
cluttering, though this can be improved as in TROPOS (Giorgini et al., 2004, 2005) 
and CORAS (Vraalsen et al., 2005; Vraalsen et al., 2005) via tool-support. This later 
methodology is based on traditional design methodologies (risk analysis, UML) but 
mainly focuses on risk. Haley et al. (Haley et al., 2004) is also based on existing 
requirements engineering methods. 
 
Textual notations are not limited by the graphical notation and can express complex 
notions in a human-understandable way, but it is only useful to the designer if guided 
as in the Matrix model as long descriptions are prone to misinterpretations and 
difficult to use. Furthermore, these notations can easily be incorporated into existing 
design methodologies, without the need to modify the design process. A HOLISTIC TRUST DESIGN PHASE 
As seen in the previous section, it is still quite difficult to find an existing 
methodology able help in designing e-services so as to make them globally 
trustworthy. It is particularly difficult in computing systems where the subjectivity 
induced by plain text English is in conflict with the operational nature of computing 
systems. This is made even more difficult in the context of emerging and changing 
technologies, where the level of abstraction is quite low and the focus is centered on 
the user. 
 
We describe a holistic methodology to analyze trust during the design of a system that 
focuses on the system user and provides insight into the subjective nature of the 
system. This methodology can be seen as a holistic trust design phase that is added at 
the start of the system development. Many of the subjective facets of trust are 
captured by this methodology, as well as objective concepts that are more directly 
applicable to real-world applications. The holistic trust design phase is composed of 
five steps that are structured as shown in Figure 1. Each step of the holistic trust 
design is described in the following sections. We then illustrate the methodology on 
several examples. 
 
 
Figure 1: The holistic trust design 
Step 1: The Scenario 
Because of the human-centric nature of trust and modern e-services, it is critically 
important that trust is explored from the user's perspective, rather than in terms of 
abstract concepts or security features, so as to appreciate the impact of particular trust 
issues on the users of the system. The holistic trust design phase reflects this 
imperative by working on scenarios. The scenarios form the foundations of the 
methodology and their development and analysis provide a valuable holistic view of 
trust that can guide the design of the electronic system. 
 
A scenario is a short, fictional narrative, set in the near future that describes people's 
daily lives, concentrating on their use of e-services under examination. The scenarios 
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It is important that the scenarios reflect the way in which people would use the e-
services to support them in their daily lives, in order to fit the technology to the task 
rather than the opposite. It is critical that the scenarios are validated by subject matter 
experts, so that they plausibly depict people and processes within the application 
domain. This validation should be done, if possible, by a person external to the trust 
analysis and the system design, so that her opinion is not biased towards the technical 
environment proposed. 
 
When writing scenarios, there is a trade-off between length and accuracy, but for the 
purpose of system development scenarios should focus on a specific set of features 
provided by the systems. The writing of scenarios is thus eased but this may limit the 
scope of the results, as a longer scenario can introduce interactions between elements 
that would be independent in smaller scenarios.  Scenarios are living documents that 
will evolve during the process of trust analysis to meet the needs of the users and of 
the system designer. Their iterative development provides insight into the system and 
enables system designers to explore the various dimensions of their system.  
Step 2: The Trust Analysis 
The second step and foundation of the holistic trust design phase involves the Trust 
Analysis Grid. A sketch of a Trust Analysis Grid (TAG) is given in Table 1. The rows 
of the grid correspond to vignettes in the scenario. The columns of the grid 
correspond to categories of trust issues that will be checked against the vignettes. 
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Table 1: Trust Analysis Grid 
These trust issue categories are also grouped into trust issues group for the sake of 
convenience (see next sections). This choice of rows and columns is particularly 
suited to the study of scenarios as it enables the reviewer to follow the flow of 
narration vertically. 
Vignettes 
Since scenarios are written in a narrative style, only certain sentences and pieces of 
sentences are of interest for analyzing the trust issues. A vignette corresponds to one 
or several pieces of one or several sentences of a scenario and constitutes a cohesive 
group with regards to the trust issues. The pieces of sentence of interest to the trust 
analysis are indicated by formatting them in italic, the rest being pieces of the sentence that do not concern the trust analysis but are displayed to ease the reading of 
the TAG. The various vignettes are examined in the order where they appear in the 
scenario. 
Trust Issue Categories 
Trust issue categories correspond to a specific property that represents one of the 
different facets of trust. They complement each other and are denoted by column 
labels in the TAG. These categories have been determined by successive analysis of 
various scenarios developed and a study of the state of the art on trust. We assume 
that the generalizations that we derived from the trust analysis are plausible because 
they have been derived from the user's interaction with the system represented in the 
plausible scenarios. 
 
Each trust issue category denotes a facet of the notion of trust that is directly observed 
in a vignette, rather than being the consequence of such an observation.  For example, 
the category Source vs. Interpretation generally may follow from the category 
Reasoning, though this latter observation is not directly observable in the scenario at 
that point. The eleven trust issue categories are: 
•  Source vs. Interpretation 
An interpretation is data that has been obtained after the processing of other data (the 
source).  The interpretation is generally less trusted than the source data itself. 
•  Accuracy 
The level of detail of an information determines how precisely trust can be evaluated 
in the system. The higher the accuracy, the more confident users will be that they can 
trust this particular part of the system. 
•  Audit trails 
An audit trail lists all the actions performed, who performed them or gave permission 
to perform them, and the events occurring in the system. This information should not 
be modifiable, or at least a modification should be detected and recorded along with 
the previous version. 
•  Authorization 
Any agent accessing a piece of information or requesting a service must have the 
permission from the system to do so, which in turn may require that the user has 
authorized it (or not denied it). 
•  Identification 
Identity is important to differentiate the participants and communicate with one of 
them. On the other hand, this identity may be limited (e.g. pseudonym) in certain 
contexts in order to provide privacy. 
•  Reliability 
This property indicates that a service operates according to its specification. Similarly, 
the property can refer to the integrity of the data produced by the service. 
•  Availability 
Availability corresponds to the temporal constraints on a service that ensure that the 
flow of action in the system is not stopped for a period of time longer than expected. 
•  Personal Responsibility 
The system cannot check everything, but some things people do will affect the 
system’s trust.  A person must remain responsible for the actions she performs, since 
they are not mediated by a trusted system. The property of accountability is important 
to put a significant level of trust in the system. •  Reasoning 
Each participant manipulates the data to process it, in order to make decisions or 
answer a request.  This process can weaken the trust another participant has in the 
system if this reasoning does not appear correct. 
•  Usability 
This aspect of trust encompasses various elements, like the intrusiveness of the 
mechanisms used to interact with the user, or its usefulness. It is a crucial element of 
trust in computer systems as they can greatly impede the user. If a system is hard to 
use correctly, it may then be used incorrectly, and this will in turn reduce the trust. 
•  Harm 
At the heart of trust is the notion of avoiding harm, since trust is a belief based on 
uncertain and approximate knowledge. It encompasses situations like loss of privacy 
(in the sense that personal data has been accessed against the will of its owner), 
breach of confidentiality, loss of financial assets, physical or emotional damage, and 
more generally risk. 
Trust Issues Groups 
The trust issue categories are grouped together into groups that correspond to 
properties at a higher level of abstraction. They are only used to organize the trust 
issue categories according to their abstract similarities. The three trust issue groups 
are: 
•  Subjective categories 
Trust issue categories: Personal Responsibility, Reasoning, Usability, Harm 
Trust is inherently subjective in that it reflects the point of view of the trustor.  The 
subjective categories involve the agent's internal state and knowledge and express its 
beliefs. They also provide part of the context that is used to interpret trust 
relationships. 
•  System categories 
Trust issue categories: Audit Trail, Authorisation, Identification, Availability, 
Reliability 
These categories relate to the underlying components and services of the computing 
system used in the scenario. This system may involve a physical device, a computer 
program, or a more general socio-economic system. 
•  Data categories 
Trust issue categories: Source vs. Interpretation, Accuracy 
These two categories describe the properties of the data from the point of view of 
trust. 
Grid Cells Values 
The TAG is populated with values that can be of various forms, each providing 
slightly different means to represent the trust issues. The grid cells of the TAG can 
contain: 
•  An X mark 
X indicates that this particular trust issue applies in its general stance in this vignette; 
the marks XX and XXX indicate values that are more, or respectively much more, 
important as those marked with an X on the same row; on the other hand, X cell 
values are not comparable between different rows. 
If in a given row with four filled cells, one needs to relate two of them in terms of 
importance (for example X and XX) and also relate the two others, but independently from the first two, then one can use different letters X and Y for the two pairs of 
values. The second one could be for example Y and YYY. 
•  The name of a more precise issue 
It is sometimes necessary to indicate more precisely which aspect of the trust issue 
category is involved in a given vignette. This is done by putting a word as a cell 
value. For example, the trust issue category Harm can be refined into physical or 
financial. 
•  A signed number 
A natural number represents the scale of the trust issue for a given vignette, 1 being 
the least important (but still present, as 0 is not used and instead the cell is empty) and 
increasing values indicating more important occurrence of the trust issue. The number 
is preceded with a negative sign (-) to represent the fact the contribution of this 
vignette to the trust issue is negative, i.e. it is an issue. On the contrary a positive sign 
(+) is used to denote the fact that the vignette addresses the particular trust issue. Note 
that values corresponding to the trust issue category Harm are always negative. 
 
Colors are also used to represent our judgment about the trust issues, as they 
emphasize that these judgments are subjective. Two colors, a light and a dark, are 
used to represent visually the convention expressed by the number sign. It can be used 
in conjunction with the number value, or alone to give more visual information. 
Step 3: Peer Review 
In the third step of the holistic trust design phase, the initial examination of trust 
issues in step 2 undergoes peer review and cross-checking. Peer review supports the 
extraction of trust issues from the perspective of another potential user, who may have 
a different view on trust issues. It may be thus the occasion to discover some missing 
trust issues by complementing the reviewer's point of view. 
 
In practice, the peer review is a very useful exercise as it forces the reviewers to 
explain and clarify their trust analysis.  The peer review is typically done during a 
meeting where the reviewers go through their TAGs and compare them. Since trust is 
a subjective matter, they may argue on whether or not a particular trust issue arises at 
one point of the scenario. This disagreement may mean that a choice between 
contradicting requirements must be made by the system designer. 
 
Disagreement occurring during the peer review may also be the consequence of trust 
analyses made from the point of view of users of the system who have a different 
roles, for example an end user and a system administrator.  The trust analyses are not 
generally compatible due to contradictory requirements occurring between the roles, 
but the peer review ensures that the overall approach to analyzing the e-services is 
consistent. 
Step 4: Scenarios Refinement 
In the fourth step, scenarios are refined by adding new text and vignettes, or removing 
existing ones to address comments that have been made during the peer review. The 
purpose of the scenarios is to provide a framework which illustrates possible 
applications of the system, and to extract the most relevant trust issues. It is important 
that the scenarios reflect the trust concerns of all the stakeholders involved, and it should be updated to represent different priorities.  However, these concerns evolve as 
the trust analysis progresses and makes explicit the various trust issues. 
 
When scenarios are updated, the sequence of steps is then executed again. The 
updated scenarios are validated by the domain experts who first validated it (step 1), 
another trust analysis is made (step 2), a peer review is organized (step 3) and the 
scenarios are possibly refined another time (step 4). This sequence is iterated until 
reviewers and system designers believe that the scenarios cover all the functionalities 
of the system and the trust analyses depict in a satisfying fashion the understanding of 
the system. 
Step 5: Guiding the Design of the System 
The four previous steps provided some insight into the trust issues underpinning the 
systems and are a means to explore the possible solutions provided by the system. In 
that sense, it follows the traditional design phase in software development based on 
use-cases. The last and final step of the holistic trust design phase consists in using the 
TAG to draw some guidelines in order to make design decisions. 
Identifying Significant Areas 
A simple visual examination of the TAG can give the system designer an overview of 
where the areas that are significant regarding trust are in the scenarios. Because of its 
visual nature and the fact that its vertical dimension corresponds to the sequential 
flow of a scenario, the TAG can be viewed as a map of the trust issues in the system 
under examination. The various areas of this map can give us some guidance on how 
to best design the system. 
 
Firstly, we can decompose the TAG into three areas corresponding to the three groups 
of trust issue categories Subjective, System and Data. This abstract typology of trust 
indicates the kind of expertise that is required for designing the system.  A Subjective-
group system may require a system designer with knowledge of social science and/or 
the law, and human-computer interface.  A System-group system corresponds to a 
system where the infrastructure plays a central role and where a technical experts in e-
services may best practice his abilities.  A Data-group system may need to be 
designed by an expert in data management and processing and/or privacy and data 
usage. 
 
Secondly, we can also examine each column of the TAG individually.  The columns 
that are full indicate that the corresponding trust issue is predominating in the system.  
This means that the system components proposed to solve this trust issue category in 
the design are given special attention and that enough resources are devoted to them. 
Ideally, the trust issue categories which have the most cell values in the TAG should 
require an additional verification pass following the system design. This verification 
should be made in reverse order, so that the most full trust issue category is verified 
last, and should carefully check that these concerns are mitigated. 
 
Thirdly, a row or a sequence of rows where a lot of cell values are present probably 
indicates a crucial point in the scenario. This corresponds to a part of the system that 
is critical regarding trust and where additional attention must be paid. Another sub-
scenario may be created to describe in more precise terms how the user interacts with the system and the system behavior, and then a new trust analysis can be run. 
Following the system design, this point in the scenario must be verified thoroughly. 
Matching Technologies against Scenarios 
Rather than using the previous guidelines, one can try to analyze the TAG in a more 
systematic way to draw some more precise conclusions. Though it is not easy because 
of the subjective nature of the trust issues that are represented, it can still shed an 
interesting light on the design issues and in particular its technical feasibility. As the 
purpose of our approach is to help in the design of e-services, any means to 
understand how best to do this is beneficial to the e-service designer. 
 
In order to introduce the technological elements into the holistic trust design, a TAG 
of the various common technologies and techniques used in modern e-services is 
used. An example of such a technology TAG is presented in Table 2. We then have 
two TAGs, one corresponding to the scenario and the other one to the technologies. 
The suitability of a particular technology at a given point (sequence of vignettes) in 
the scenario is given in terms of how close its pattern (a row of eleven cell values) 
matches the area corresponding to this point in the TAG of the scenario. 
 
This pattern matching technique differs from the previous heuristic method in that it 
relates the informal analyses of scenarios and the technologies, and provides a point 
of anchorage for a more formal approach. As scenarios and its TAG are refined 
through the iterative sequence of steps of the holistic trust design, the technology 
TAG is completed to match the system’s technological needs. 
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Wireless  Network      X X X X X X    X X 
Grid  Computing        X X X X    X X X 
Peer-to-Peer  Network     X  X  X  X  X    X 
Sensors  X  X  X  X  X  X  
Data  Records  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Network  Traffic  X  X        X    X  
Audio  and  Video  Data  X  X  X    X  X  X  
Speech  Data  X  X        X  X  X  
Pads       X      X  X  X  
Location  and  Context   X            X    
HUDs            X  X 
Personal  Agents  X X X      X    X X X   
Service  Agents   X  X  X  X  X  X    Encryption         X      
Digital  Signatures       X      X      
Authorization 
Mechanism     X  X  X  X  X      
Authentication   X  X  X  X    X  
Time  Limited  Leases      X X X X X X    X   
Domain-based  Security       X  X        X  
Table 2: Technology TAG 
EXAMPLES 
We describe here three examples of concrete applications of the holistic trust design 
phase that will help to understand it and demonstrate its usefulness. For the sake of 
brevity, some stories have been truncated and unnecessary elements were removed. 
The trust analysis is presented in the form of the trust analysis grid, using various cell 
value formats for the different scenarios. Step 3 of the holistic trust design phase is 
not discussed for the sake of conciseness. 
E-healthcare 
We present a scenario in the context of e-healthcare. In this futuristic but realistic 
scenario, various police and health workers collaborate on a crash scene. The scenario 
actors are performing their work and duties using computer devices and e-services to 
improve the patient treatment. 
The Scenario 
Neil is driving to work, when, suddenly, brake lights flare and Neil is jolted 
alert.  There seems to be a wall of slowing cars and smoke is pouring from the 
wheels of the car in front. Neil’s car was too close to avoid a collision. As the 
motorway grinds to a halt, it appears that three cars have crashed.  Other 
motorists have managed to avoid the initial accident on both sides, but some 
have had minor collisions. 
 
The emergency services already know much of the situation.  As soon as the 
cars' airbags were triggered by the crash, the cars transmitted a distress call, 
including their location (given by the navigation systems) and the number of 
occupants (detected by simple pressure sensors in the seats).  The first car's 
phone was too badly damaged to transmit its call, but for 999 calls it was able 
to piggy-back on the phone of the second car using short-range networking. 
 
The emergency control room dispatches a small number of police, fire and 
ambulance vehicles immediately.  The incoming calls from other motorists, 
and images from a traffic camera on a nearby bridge, seem to confirm the 
seriousness of the accident, and further vehicles are dispatched.  The 
controller also sends an incident support vehicle to assist with clear-up.  The 
information known so far is shared between all of the vehicles en-route.   
Information on traffic flow and speed is also shared between the vehicles to 
enable them to avoid blocked or slow routes.  The dispatch and arrival of the 
vehicles is logged automatically to provide statistics on response times.  
The traffic police are first on scene, and begin making the area safe as best 
they can.  The video feed from their speed camera is available to the control 
room, but at low bandwidth.  A still image is shared with the vehicles en-route 
though.  The police confirm the number of vehicles involved, and the number 
of casualties.  They quickly take a few evidential photos of the scene, and 
begin basic first responder treatment.  These photos are shared with the en-
route vehicles and the hospitals. 
 
Neil is awake now.  One of the policemen is trying to hand him over to the first 
paramedic on scene, but the policeman is told to keep holding Neil's head still 
while the paramedic triages the other casualties.  He informs the ambulances 
and the control room of his findings by radio.  The control room enters this 
information into the log for the incident, which is shared with the receiving 
hospitals. 
 
The ambulances are arriving on scene and, after checking with the fire-
fighters that the scene is secure, the paramedics continue treatment.  They 
record their assessment and treatment onto normal paper report forms, but 
these are backed by smart clipboards that record and recognize the 
handwriting and ticked boxes, and can forward that information if required.  
Each patient is given an RFID tag, normally on a wristband, to enable the 
incident records to follow them around the system. 
 
Neil seems to be relatively unhurt, but is immobilized with a cervical collar and 
board until spinal injury can be ruled out.  The spinal board, sadly, doesn't 
have any sensors yet, but it does have an embedded RFID tag to identify 
which ambulance organization it belongs to.  The fire-fighters are busy cutting 
up the car in front, and one of them is taking a few quick photos with his 
helmet camera for the incident support crew, to give them some idea of the 
scene. 
Trust Analysis 
We present below in Table 3 the TAG for the scenario described above.  Due to the 
high number of actors and situations described, the TAG is quite big, but it could be 
split into smaller TAGs if necessary. 
 
An interesting vignette in this scenario with regards to the technologies envisaged in 
pervasive systems is the piggy-backing of the first car’s phone. In this situation, the 
piggy-backing implies that the phone call does not originate from the source and that 
some sort of authorization system enabled the first car’s phone to use the resources of 
an unknown car around it. The availability of this technology is here paramount, but 
on the other hand could lead to abuses (harm) if the call serves other purposes than 
emergency. All other trust issue categories were not represented here. 
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three cars have crashed    X            X  
motorists have managed to 
avoid the … accident  X    X       X     
minor collisions    X            
emergency services already 
know much of the situation   X          X    X 
the cars transmitted a 
distress call     X     X  X      
piggy-back on the phone of 
the second car  X    X  X        X 
emergency control room 
dispatches… vehicles     X        X    
the  seriousness of the 
accident    X            
The information known so 
far is shared      X    X    X     
The dispatch and arrival of 
the vehicles is logged     X      X        
traffic police are first on 
scene     X        X      
making the area safe              X  
The  video feed… at low 
bandwidth  X  X  X     X       X 
the  number of vehicles 
involved, and the number 
of casualties 
  X  X      X      
evidential photos of the 
scene  X    X      X  X     
begin basic first responder 
treatment      X       X      
These photos are shared  X     X    X  X      
the paramedic triages the 
other casualties         X     X     
enters this information into 
the log     X     X       X 
shared with the receiving 
hospitals  X     X    X  X      
the scene is secure             X  
normal paper report forms  X            X    smart clipboards that 
record and recognize the 
handwriting and ticked 
boxes, and can forward that 
information 
X  X  X    X  X    
RFID tag       X       X  X 
the incident records  X     X           
The spinal board, sadly, 
doesn't have any sensors …    X      X  X      
… but it does have an 
embedded RFID tag       X       X  X 
Table 3: TAG of the E-Healthcare scenario 
Guiding the Design 
This long scenario was part of the bunch of scenarios that helped devise the design 
methodology and improve the trust analysis grid by going through several rounds of 
analysis. Though realistic and validated by a first aider, the system was not designed 
and developed further. The scenario is here to illustrate the first steps of the holistic 
trust design phase, but design and development are not part of the requirements. 
 
The scenario and TAG enable to look at the system and services from two different 
viewpoints, thus separating functionalities from properties. For example the scenario 
made use of technologies not yet fully implemented (pervasive network, RFID), but 
providing the right functionalities and the TAG lead to hard requirements on these 
technologies (availability, harm). 
Theme Park 
This scenario is set in the context of a pervasive Theme Park, named Vaughn Park, 
which is fully equipped with pervasive computers that provide e-services to the 
customers. Park tickets are embedded with location technology (e.g. wi-fi, RFID that 
enable to provide context-dependent services. The focus of this scenario is a virtual 
queuing system where users can queue for ride and play a treasure hunt game that will 
guide them to the ride. 
 
This scenario contains an hypothetical part (between brackets) that illustrate the 
expressive power of the holistic trust design, where various design branch can be 
explored by adding optional features and situations. 
The Scenario 
Janet and John are having a great time at Vaughn Park, but now that they 
have been on all the rides they wanted to, except for Hubris which has a long 
queue, they are beginning to get a little bored. They and their parents have 
joined Hubris' queue, but there is an estimated wait of over an hour until they'll 
be able to ride. Their parents suggest that they try one of the pervasive 
games the park offers. 
The information kiosk can tell that they're waiting for Hubris, and it also knows 
that Janet and John have been on many of the rides that are likely to interest them, so it thinks that the Treasure Hunt game is a good candidate for them. 
Indeed it is, so they choose to play the game.  
The first clue is a simple one: "Can you find a big squirrel?" (If they weren't old 
enough to be reading yet, they could be given picture-only clues, but only if 
their parents played along with them.) Janet remembers that there is a 
squirrel on one of the Merry-go-rounds in the green area.  
When they find the Merry-go-round they go up to an information kiosk. The 
kiosk knows they are playing Treasure Hunt, and that they are looking for a 
big squirrel. The one on the Merry-go-round isn't the one it had in mind, so it 
displays a message saying "Good try! But this one isn't big enough, can you 
find a bigger one? It's quite close!"  
John notices a topiary cat on the other side of the Merry-go-round, and 
wonders whether there might be some more topiary nearby.  
What a surprise! There is the squirrel, sculpted in the hedging. And neither of 
them had noticed it at all when they were on the Merry-go-round! The nearby 
kiosk congratulates them warmly, and asks them to find a big cleaning 
implement. They don't really know what to look for, so they don't move. The 
kiosk gives them a bigger clue: "who might use a cleaning implement, but not 
necessarily for cleaning?" That's it! Off they go, to the haunted house, which 
has a witch!  
After successfully solving several more clues, the final clue leads them to 
Hubris, where they find their parents waiting. Their ride is great, and they go 
home afterwards talking very fast with a lot of excitement about the great day 
out.  
Trust Analysis 
Before we give the TAG in Table 4 below, we detail the analysis of one vignette of 
the scenario. This vignette is when the children do not understand what they should be 
looking for, and the kiosk gives them a clue. The piece of sentence of interest here is 
the bigger clue. It is a usability feature, as it will make the Treasure Hunt game more 
usable to the children. It also requires the system to reason about the situation, e.g. 
detect that the children are waiting for a clue because they are not standing in front of 
the kiosk. The input of this process is the activity of the children, which is their 
personal responsibility, while the output is a clue, which should reliably help the 
children. The other categories do not apply to this piece of sentence of interest. 
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 estimated wait of over 
an hour    tim
e           
The information kiosk 
can tell…           X     
... that they  are  waiting      X  X    X     
it also knows that Janet 
and John have been     X           XX     
rides that are likely to 
interest them    XX       X  XX    
So the system thinks  that     X           XX     
they  choose to play the 
game     X          X    
If they were not old 
enough to be reading 
yet, they could be given 
picture-only clues, but 
only if their parents 
played along with them 
        XX  X  XX  X 
The kiosk knows they 
are playing Treasure 
Hunt 
     X     X  X    
the one it had in mind  ...      X        X    
... so it displays a 
message          X    X  X 
The nearby kiosk 
congratulates them 
warmly 
     X     X  X  X   
They  don't really know 
what to look for          X      X  
The kiosk gives them a 
bigger clue         X  X  X  X   
the final clue leads them 
to Hubris       X      X  X  X  
Table 4: TAG of the Theme Park scenario 
Guiding the Design 
We first notice that the TAG is mostly filled with trust issues from the group 
Subjective. This is explained by the fact that the Pervasive Theme Park is a closed 
environment and this greatly simplifies the security requirements. Furthermore, the 
services provided are not data-intensive. This indicates that the application described 
in the scenario is a quite subtle application, what corresponds to intuition that it is 
user-friendly, and that the emphasis should be put on the perception of the system by 
the user during the design. 
From the point of view of individual trust issue categories, Personal Responsibility 
and Reasoning are the ones that are most filled. The first category corresponds to the 
fact that the user has the total freedom to walk around the Pervasive Theme Park 
during the game and she is responsible for her actions when looking for the clues, while the system is not interacting with her. The second category underlines the fact 
that the game corresponds to a hunt and must be adapted to the way the user performs 
it. To make the application more trustworthy, the user expects the system to act with 
her in a way consistent with the status of her hunt. The system designer shall include 
inference and pro-active capabilities of good quality. 
 
Finally, no row distinguishes itself from the others, notably due to the overall 
importance and continuous presence of trust issues from the Subjective group. This 
may be explained by the fact that the application is focused on the user whose 
mobility avoids concentrating the system capabilities into one particular part of the 
scenario. 
E-learning 
This last example describes uses of an e-learning application named ShowNTalk. This 
commercial application allows pupils to create and show presentations on PDAs and 
is aimed at improving the reading, writing, presentational and IT skills of primary 
school pupils. The scenario served as a basis for the implementation of its first 
prototype, while the TAG helped in identifying the trust issues and improve the 
application. 
The Scenario 
Liz, a primary school teacher, has decided to assign her class of pupils an 
assignment to do on their PDA’s. The children will prepare a multimedia 
presentation on the different types of cloud formations, working individually on 
their PDA’s. 
After creating an introductory slide about clouds on his PDA Sam notices his 
geography book has a chapter on cloud formations. Sam uses the PDA to 
take a picture of a page in a book which has a picture of a cumulus cloud and 
some text describing it. He uses the voice annotation feature to record himself 
reading aloud the text on the page. He later finds a page in the same book 
about stratus clouds but there’s no picture so he uses the stylus on the PDA 
to input the text from the book and adds a voice recording of the text. When 
looking outside Sam spots a cirrus cloud in the sky and goes outside to use 
the camera function to take a picture of the cloud and add some text using the 
stylus. 
Later in the day the pupils present their work to their teacher using the 
slideshow option in the software. The software automatically scrolls through 
the slides, showing the pictures and text whilst playing any audio files present 
with each. Liz asks each pupil to upload their work to the server. 
After her pupils have gone home Liz reviews some of the presentations 
starting with Sam’s. She checks Sam’s previous work on the server and 
notices a comment saying that his reading needed some work. From his latest 
presentation she notices that his reading of the text on many of the slides is 
much better so she adds a comment to the presentation stored on the server. Trust Analysis 
The following TAG in Table 5 uses the color yellow (light) for issues that need to be 
addressed and green (dark) for those that are addressed. 
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Liz gives assignment to 
pupils                
Sam takes picture of page in 
book                   
Sam records himself reading 
text from book                 
Sam copies text from book 
into PDA using stylus                 
Sam takes pictures of cirrus 
cloud                
Sam adds text to slide about 
cirrus cloud                
Sam uses slideshow options                   
Sam uploads work to server                   
Liz reviews some 
presentations               
Liz checks Sam’s previous 
work on server                
Liz  notices  a  comment             
Liz adds a comment                    
Table 5: TAG of the E-Learning scenario 
Guiding the Design 
The trust analysis reveals various strengths and weaknesses of the system with regard 
to trust. On the positive side, the trust issue categories Availability, Reliability and 
Usability are well addressed. This shows that the application depicted in the scenario 
is user-friendly, as these trust issue categories are among the ones that are perceived 
directly by the user. 
The TAG shows that the ShowNTalk application has several limitations in the areas 
of Identification and Authorization, two security properties.  For example, there is no 
way to record which pupil is using a given PDA, or whether the pupil is entitled to 
synchronize his work with the school’s server. The trust analysis shows clearly that 
addressing these two trust issue categories should reduce greatly the number of trust issues in the system (at least from the point of view of this scenario, which is 
representative of the system use). This analysis result led the development team to 
introduce a login system on the PDA and an access control list on the server. The 
prototype tests showed that this design improved the trustworthiness of the prototype 
and that this was overall a good design decision as it was focused on a specific part of 
the system and used the  
The introduction of this security component in the system affects the Usability issue, 
which need to be addressed in the next version of the application, notably by 
improving the GUI and considering HCI aspects of the application. This is a more 
traditional aspect of the design that can now be considered separately from the holistic 
trust design. 
FUTURE TRENDS 
As trust and e-services get more pervasive in computing systems, reliance on them 
will increase too and understanding the various aspects composing trust will be as 
important as mastering how these aspects are composed. As each aspect of trust gets 
more and more diverse and complex (Josang et al., 2005), design will be particularly 
important in order to ensure the trustworthiness of whole systems. This trend should 
follow the general trend in the software industry to try to address significant issues as 
early as possible during the development process. 
 
The subjective side of trust encompasses at the moment the facets of trust that are 
understood the least, for example usability, see Bottoni et al. (Bottoni et al., 2000) for 
a rare example, and the law. These topics will get more attention as trust is better 
understood by researchers and developers, and this trend will increase as more 
application will use trust and users will have to consider this issue more often. 
 
While independent aspects of trust are better understood (dynamics, risk, etc.), the 
study of their combination will become critical. Standardization efforts will help in 
introducing some coherence in the field, as well as activities proposing to compare the 
various propositions like the Agent Reputation and Trust Testbed (ART Testbed, 
2006). 
 
Security is a growing concern nowadays, as vulnerabilities become more difficult to 
find and threats cause increasing damages. In many ways, trust is tied to security, 
though this relationship is not well understood yet. Anderson (Anderson, 2001) 
highlights the need for security usability, while the 14
th International Workshop on 
Security Protocols ("Fourteenth International Workshop on Security Protocols", 2006) 
propose to “put the human back in the protocol" because he is “directly aware of the 
security requirement, or has access to the correct system state at the outer level of 
abstraction.” This later aspect is reminiscent of the holistic nature of trust. 
CONCLUSION 
If modern e-services are to be successful, compelling applications will not be enough 
to make it enter people's daily life. More efforts are needed to both find a suitable way 
to implement it and to make it trustworthy. Trust is a key notion in these systems. It 
supports both a better understanding of the system by the user and a better 
representation of the user's needs and concerns, since it is a concept inspired by a 
human notion.  
Much in the recent years proposed ways to address part of the trust issue, but few 
tried to tackle the problem from a holistic point of view, where the various parts are 
put in the perspective of real systems. The holistic nature of trust is difficult to 
capture, as well as its subjective nature. Firstly the issue has to be tackled early during 
the development cycle so as to think about the system as a whole rather than 
concentrate on its parts. Secondly scenarios, or use-cases, are intuitive and powerful 
means to explore the system ideas by putting them in the context of its use. Lastly, 
guidelines should be provided on the various facets of trust issues, rather than 
imposing a particular definition of trust. An important point here is that they should 
guide the system designers at an adequate level of abstraction. 
 
Many methodologies exist, but most do not address these requirements as they tackle 
specific aspects of trust or are difficult to apply to the design of concrete e-services. 
They put on the system designer the responsibility of bringing together the various 
parts that can be gathered from the different methodologies. 
 
On the contrary, the previous requirements are addressed by the holistic trust design 
presented in this chapter, as it is a process preceding the system design, it centers on 
scenarios and the Trust Analysis Grid guides the designer during the analysis of the 
system. The holistic trust design phase is based on 5 steps and revolves around the 
scenarios and the TAG by iterating the steps until a stable design of the system is 
achieved from the point of view of trust. By focusing on domain expert-validated 
scenarios, the design phase stays close to the user concerns that are crucial to achieve 
trustworthiness. By providing an abstract decomposition of trust that covers a wide 
range of topics, it helps the system designer to identify the trust issues and to try to 
mitigate them in subsequent round of trust analysis. 
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